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on every occasion, so not every case of failing to help observed in these 
experiments is contrary to virtue.
Adams claims that there is a great deal of moral luck in the develop-
ment of any person’s character so that virtue is to a very large measure a 
gift, rather than an individual achievement; nonetheless, virtue is excel-
lent and admirable.
This is an outstanding book, one of the very best books ever written on 
this most important topic. It is required reading for anyone interested in the 
virtues or ethical theory. Adams’s many examples are very apt and help-
ful; some of his observations about them are gems—marvels of insight and 
good sense. Adams’s book is also very clear and lucid, unusually clear and 
accessible for such an important contribution to philosophy. This makes it 
very suitable for use in upper division undergraduate courses. This book 
deserves a wide readership by philosophers and students of philosophy. 
The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Sceptical Religion, by J. L. Schellenberg. 
Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2009.
AKU VISALA, Oxford University
The Will to Imagine (henceforth Will) is the latest installment in J. L. 
Schellenberg’s trilogy on philosophy of religion. In the two previous 
books, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (2005) and The Wisdom to 
Doubt: A Justification of Religious Scepticism (2007), Schellenberg strongly 
criticised most classical and contemporary arguments for belief in God. In 
philosophy of religion circles, Schellenberg is probably best known for his 
earlier work Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993), in which he pres-
ents his famous argument against theism from the hiddenness of God. 
The argument from hiddenness has since created a great deal of debate 
and Schellenberg himself has defended it in several different forums. The 
reader of these books and his other works might easily get the impression 
that Schellenberg seeks to abandon all possible forms of religion and ad-
vocate some form of naturalism. But this, as Will shows, is far from being 
the case.
The book is basically what the title says it is: an attempt to defend a cer-
tain kind of religious attitude—an attitude that is neither belief in some 
sort of God nor belief in the non-existence of God or gods. Schellenberg 
has set out to formulate a third position between these two alternatives. 
This middle position, however, is not strictly speaking an agnostic one as 
one might first think but a religious one—a sceptical religious attitude. 
Instead of religious or non-religious belief, Schellenberg suggests that faith 
would be a more proper attitude. The proper object of faith is what he 
calls ultimism. Ultimism is what 
BOOK REVIEWS 353
all . . . religious propositions can be seen as gesturing toward: that what is 
deepest in reality (metaphysically ultimate) is also unsurpassably great (axi-
ologically ultimate) and the source of ultimate good (salvific). (xii) 
Ultimism, according to Schellenberg, is the common core of most religions 
and it can be extracted from the particularities and historical claims of indi-
vidual religious traditions. Faith in ultimism can survive the philosophical 
challenges that belief in God cannot, and it can also provide grounds for 
a truly religious way of life. Such are the claims that Schellenberg seeks to 
defend in his book.
The book consists of five parts. In the first part, “Purifying Faith,” he clar-
ifies the notion of ultimism, examines objections to it and lays the ground-
work for understanding the difference between believing and having faith. 
Here he devotes a considerable number of pages to establishing that faith 
in ultimism can support a robust religious form of life and religious com-
mitment. In part 2, “Testing Faith,” Schellenberg introduces his criteria for 
justified faith commitments and argues that his sceptical religion and faith 
in ultimism are indeed justified as far as reason can judge.
Parts 3 and 4 (“Renewing Faith”) do most of the philosophical heavy 
lifting. There Schellenberg cleverly uses most traditional arguments—
both epistemic and non-epistemic—to argue for ultimism instead of the-
ism. He is convinced that when understood properly the arguments for 
belief in the existence of God actually turn out to be arguments for faith 
in ultimism. Finally, in the last part, “Keeping Faith,” Schellenberg pulls it 
all together and examines different modes of religious attitudes. His argu-
ment there is that faith in ultimism can provide a kind of religious vision 
that unifies personal, moral, aesthetic and intellectual aspects of life.
In Will, Schellenberg in building on the conclusions he made in his two 
previous books. There he argued that religious scepticism is the only rea-
sonable alternative for people in our situation. His scepticism consists of 
two components: categorical scepticism and capacity scepticism. First of 
all, our limitations as human beings preclude us from having knowledge 
about religious issues. Our epistemic situation is such that there are no 
reasons available to us to warrant religious belief. Schellenberg calls this 
categorical scepticism and says that it consists of having an attitude of 
doubt or disbelief towards the proposition that “there is truth in religion.” 
Capacity scepticism, on the other hand, is a view according to which we 
are at a point in our development as humanity such that we do not have 
the cognitive capacities and other relevant properties required to obtain 
basic truths about either the existence of ultimate reality or the details 
concerning its nature. Schellenberg sees human knowledge, both scientific 
and religious, as works in progress: there might be “hundreds of millions 
of years that may remain for reason and also religion to be developed fur-
ther” (xii). In the light of the future development of religion, Schellenberg 
claims that the detailed claims about God and gods of current religious 
traditions are premature and scepticism is the proper attitude with respect 
to such propositions. Schellenberg’s view is that with respect to truth in 
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religion, reason leads to the conclusion that we are unable to know whether 
there are such truths. As a consequence, we should refrain from believing 
anything about religious matters.
Thus, Schellenberg’s religious scepticism does not correspond to athe-
ism, if we define atheism as a view according to which we should believe 
that God does not exist. Nor does it amount to metaphysical naturalism. 
Schellenberg thinks that 
the popular bipolarizing stance that says one must accept either a conserva-
tive believing form of religion or an irreligious naturalism has embraced a 
misleading and false antithesis. . . . If I am right, naturalistic belief is every 
bit as unjustified as believing religion. (252) 
Belief in naturalism is not where reason leads us, but rather it leads us to 
scepticism. Such scepticism, Schellenberg claims, is not the end of ratio-
nal religion, but its beginning. A set of core claims can be extracted from 
religions—a purified religious vision—that we can have faith in, but not 
belief. This is what he means by ultimism. Let us now look at what exactly 
Schellenberg means by “faith in ultimism” and how it differs from both 
religious belief and religious disbelief.
Schellenberg sees a common core in all religion. According to this core 
set of propositions—what Schellenberg calls ultimism—there “is (meta-
physically and axiologically) ultimate reality in relation to which an ul-
timate good can be attained” (15). He distinguishes this simple ultimism 
from qualified versions of this view of particular religions that add dif-
ferent sorts of details to the simply ultimist picture. Theism, for example, 
conceives the ultimate reality as personal, causally efficacious and maxi-
mally powerful. The reason why simple ultimism is better than its quali-
fied competitors is that qualified ultimism leads to sectarianism and ex-
clusivism. There are big differences not only among religions, but inside 
religions as well. In addition, adding more properties to ultimate reality 
makes it more liable to contradictions and instability. By removing the 
details of particular qualified ultimistic views, Schellenberg claims that 
we get a purified form of a core set of religious propositions that is open 
to different kinds of interpretations. But religion is not just having faith or 
belief in certain propositions, but rather
religion should . . . be understood as involving a commitment fundamental 
among one’s commitment to cultivate dispositions appropriate for the states 
of affairs represented by ultimism, which either in belief or in faith one takes 
to obtain: religious persons . . . make central to their lives the project of con-
forming how they live to the standards suggested by there being an ultimate 
reality in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained. (18)
The proper attitude towards simple ultimism is faith, not belief. Much 
of Will’s argument rests on this—quite unorthodox—distinction of faith 
and belief, so let us examine it next. In short, Schellenberg understands 
belief as a passive attitude and faith as an active, imaginative attitude. 
To have a belief that p is for a subject S to think that the state of affairs 
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reported by p obtains. Such an attitude is passive: S automatically experi-
ences the world in such a way that p obtains: Schellenberg would say that 
the evidence causes S to see the world in a certain way. Faith, however, is 
a more active attitude for S than belief. For S to have faith that p is for S to 
wilfully assent that p in a situation where S believes that the state of affairs 
that p represents is good and desirable, but where one lacks belief in p. To 
assent to a proposition, according to Schellenberg, is to adhere to a certain 
policy: going along with the propositions and imagining that the world is 
like that. This assent is an act of will in the face of insufficient evidence; it 
is not passively caused by evidence like belief. Thus in belief you accept 
p passively, in faith you wilfully and imaginatively represent to yourself 
that p obtains and behave accordingly. To have ultimistic religious faith 
means for S that S 
finds herself without evidence sufficient to cause belief in these proposi-
tions [ultimism] (recognizing that they may be false or perhaps even in some 
hidden way incoherent), but positively evaluating the states of affairs they 
report, she nonetheless tenaciously pictures or imagines the world to herself 
as a world in which they are true and committedly gives her assent to what 
is thus held before the mind. (35)
Ultimistic religious faith can then be taken as a ground for religion and 
religious practices of different kinds. If the faithful ultimist will then com-
mit to shaping her life to align with the standards that flow from ultimism, 
then the faithful ultimist is indeed religious in Schellenberg’s sense. Faith 
in ultimism is, thus, a genuine religious attitude, but regardless of her 
commitment, the faithful ultimist, if asked, would not say that ultimism 
is true.
If this is what having ultimistic religion means, why should we practice 
it? If there is no evidence for ultimism, why have faith in it? Schellenberg’s 
answer is that there are positive arguments that reveal how valuable and 
good the states of affairs that ultimism reports actually are. If we have good 
reasons to think that the existence of a metaphysically ultimate reality that 
is also unsurpassably good is indeed an extremely good thing (that is, valu-
able human goals are fulfilled if the world turns out to be like that), then 
ultimistic faith should follow. This is the function of parts three and four of 
Will. The interesting thing here is that Schellenberg basically refits classical 
evidential and non-evidential arguments for belief in God to arguments 
for having ultimistic faith. He discusses the ontological, cosmological and 
teleological arguments as well as the non-evidential arguments of Kant, 
Pascal and James. Next, I will describe just a few points about these argu-
ments so as to give the gist of Schellenberg’s reasoning.
In the hands of Schellenberg, Anselm’s ontological reasoning, for in-
stance, leads to the idea that since our alignment with the maximally 
valuable ultimate reality is intrinsically so incredibly valuable, we should 
assent to the possibility of such a reality. With respect to the cosmologi-
cal argument, Schellenberg claims that its underlying principle is the 
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complete rationality and the possibility of a complete understanding of 
the world. If ultimism is the case, then the world is indeed rational and 
understandable and this state of affairs would be extremely valuable to us 
humans. The existence of a complete and accessible truth would promote 
a relentless human pursuit of truth. If “no human form of life is rationally 
sufficient unless it allows one to pursue the conjunction of our various 
understanding related aims in the best possible way” (123) then ultimistic 
faith is, again, a justified response to such propositions. Similar reasoning 
is applied to the teleological argument as well: having faith in ultimism 
preserves our concern with the beauty and order of the natural world and 
would motivate us to protect the natural world.
Non-evidential arguments for belief in God are also absorbed into 
Schellenberg’s argument. Schellenberg’s own faith in ultimism is very 
close to that of William James: the title of Schellenberg’s Will is an homage 
to James’s The Will to Believe. Will describes James’s idea of the faith-ladder 
that begins from the acknowledgement of the possibility of an extremely 
valuable states of affairs (such as ultimism in some form or another) and 
concludes that since such states ought to be true, one should hold that 
such states of affairs “shall be true, at any rate true for me.” For James, it 
is our good will that is the source of our religious attitudes, not our intel-
lect. This, of course, is something with which Schellenberg agrees whole-
heartedly. In addition, Schellenberg highlights the fact that at no point 
in his defence of wilful religious attitude does James invoke the truth of 
religious propositions. Finally, Schellenberg also praises James for the fact 
that, instead of theism, his religious attitude was directed towards a more 
general “religious hypothesis” according to which there is an ultimate 
reality in communion with which we will achieve our ultimate goal. Al-
though James is very difficult to interpret at some points, Schellenberg 
sees him as his closest ally in the search for a new, sceptical but passionate 
religious alternative.
Since simple ultimism and the “religious hypothesis” of James ought 
to be true because they satisfy human desire for certain goods, we should 
passionately and imaginatively assent to them. If simple ultimism is true, 
then it will realise a wide array of human goods: the alignment with the 
ultimate and the possibility of understanding and the respect for beauty, 
for instance. As these goods realise valuable human goals, they are so de-
sirable and valuable to us that their possible existence warrants us to have 
faith that they really exist and that we should live as if ultimism were true 
(although knowing that we can never believe it to be true). It is simply the 
extremely great value of the states of affairs represented by ultimism that 
should drive us wilfully to assent to ultimism.
Next I will raise some questions and issues that seem to me to be prob-
lematic in the argument of Will. The first question has to do with the 
justification of religious scepticism. Of course, Will simply begins by 
assuming that Schellenberg’s case for scepticism is sound. But Will never-
theless rests on the inevitability of religious scepticism. If it turns out to be 
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the case that there is indeed good evidence for certain religious beliefs, say, 
theism, then belief that God exists would be a more appropriate attitude, 
not faith. Faith comes into play only when there is no evidence available, 
or rather when there is good reason to think that no evidence will ever be 
available for propositions about ultimate reality because of our cognitive 
and developmental limitations. Several of Schellenberg’s arguments for 
religious scepticism (the divine hiddenness argument, for instance) have 
been critically discussed in the philosophy of religion literature and their 
conclusions do not seem self-evidently clear. But this is not really the topic 
of Will, so it need not be discussed here.
Second, we might grant Schellenberg that it would be desirable that ul-
timism obtained in some form or another. But then a question arises: even 
if it would be extremely desirable that ultimism obtained, would we not 
deceive ourselves somehow if we wilfully assented to ultimism and lived 
as if it were true? The intuition that many people, especially philosophers, 
have is that non-evidential arguments are never enough to warrant such a 
commitment. It seems quite difficult to resist the idea that the religion of 
the faithful ultimist is simply a fancy form of wishful thinking: the faith-
ful ultimist looks at the world and by the use of her reason concludes 
that there is no good evidence for the existence of an ultimate reality, but 
nevertheless she considers the existence of such a reality and our align-
ment with it so valuable that she nevertheless decides to imagine that this 
is how things really are and lives accordingly. It is difficult to see how the 
arguments of Will could dislodge this intuition; religious scepticism, thus, 
does seem to lead to the rejection of all religious (and anti-religious) at-
titudes. Some believing atheists openly confess that the existence of a god, 
gods, God or some other ultimate might be preferable to naturalism, that 
is, the world would be better (more valuable or good) if such things exist-
ed. Without such entities or realities, extremely valuable human goals and 
desires might very well be left unfulfilled (justice, love, peace, progress, 
for instance), but since they do not see how the existence of such realities 
could be possible, they reject both faith and belief in anything “ultimate” 
behind the natural world. Atheists such as the British philosopher John 
Gray see religious scepticism as true, but not intrinsically valuable. In 
order to convince such atheists, Schellenberg would need to show that 
their response to ultimistic propositions is flawed. But it is difficult to see 
how this would happen without Schellenberg resorting to reasons for the 
truth of such propositions (which he cannot do because of his scepticism), 
not just to considerations about the desirability or value of the possible 
truth of ultimism.
Finally, reasons for faith have to be quite strong to provide motiva-
tion for the continuous exercise of the will and imagination. In belief, as 
Schellenberg understands it, the evidence causes the subject to see the 
world in a certain way, so there is no need for exercising the will to assent 
to propositions that are believed. In faith, however, the subject has to con-
tinuously wilfully assent and imagine that ultimism is true even when the 
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subject knows that there is really no evidence for ultimism. If there is no 
evidence for the truth of ultimism, questions can be raised about whether 
such wilful assenting is psychologically too demanding to uphold. Our 
reasons for belief in the desirability of ultimism need to be extremely good 
to make the continuous effort of exercising our imagination worthwhile. 
Schellenberg answers this objection to some extent (chapter 3) by claiming 
that imagination combined with different kinds of religious practices is 
enough to support commitment in ultimism without belief. But if this is 
the case, what would motivate the faithful ultimist to engage in (sceptical) 
religious practices in the first place, if not some kind of belief? It is difficult 
to see where the initial motivation comes from if not from some kind of 
intuition or evidence “that there might be (some) truth to religion.”
Despite these open questions and issues, it must be acknowledged that 
Schellenberg has indeed been able to create a truly alternative position to 
those currently motivating most philosophy of religion. By doing so, he 
is deeply grounded in a tradition of Western philosophy that emphasises 
the pragmatic and non-evidential aspect of religion and also represents a 
contemporary reinvigoration of this tradition. 
Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, edited by Kevin 
Timpe. New York: Routledge, 2009. 262 pages. $126 (hardback).
JOSEPH SHAW, St Benet’s Hall, Oxford University
The fourteen essays in this collection illustrate the range of interests of 
Eleonore Stump, in whose honor they have been written. While it would 
be impossible in a review to give a proper assessment of every paper, I 
shall pick out some contrasting examples with a view to saying something 
about the development of the discipline under Stump’s influence, illus-
trated by the collection as a whole.
Some of the essays here display a degree of precision which even the 
most demanding analytic philosopher could not fault. Brian Leftow’s 
“Aquinas, Divine Simplicity and Divine Freedom” and Thomas Flint’s 
“Fittingness and Divine Action in Cur Deus Homo” are careful, dense, and 
acute discussions of some very knotty problems.
In order to get to grips with his chosen problem, as a problem within 
the Thomist system (though certainly not only within that system), Leftow 
has to get to grips with Aquinas’s logical presuppositions, which include 
the idea that events become necessary when they are in the past. Leftow 
is to be commended for making clear (if not simple) the relationship be-
tween what Aquinas says, and the way we might express it.
This is a mere prologue, however, to the actual problem of divine sim-
plicity and freedom, which turns on whether and in what precise way, 
God might differ in different possible worlds, on Thomist principles. This 
